At the Devil’s Gate – Observations of the Koizumi “Revolution”

By Scott B. MacDonald

On November 9th, 2003 Japanese voters went to the polls to elect their next government. Although the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) achieved substantial gains (winning 40 additional seats to end up with a total of 177), Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Liberal Democrats won 240 seats, which with its coalition allies, gives it a secure majority of 278 seats in the lower house of the Diet. Koizumi now starts a second term with a popular mandate to implement the so-called “Koizumi revolution.” But is it really a revolution? Is the Prime Minister really capable of moving Japan into a new era of sustainable economic growth, supported by a restructured economy?

The expression “Devil’s Gate” came up during a conversation in Tokyo in 2003 about President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq. The Japanese speaker indicated that by invading Iraq, the President put himself at the Devil’s Gate – at the door of considerable potential troubles. Simply stated, on one side of the Devil’s Gate all was well; on the other side were the demons of treachery, war and deceit. For many reasons President Bush walked through the Devil’s Gate and the United States entered unknown country. In the same respect, Junichiro Koizumi’s decision to become Japan’s prime minister in 2001 took him to the Devil’s Gate. While Japan can hardly compare to Iraq in terms of political chaos, the East Asian country was in a troubled state – the economy was suffering from over a decade of stagnation, the political will for change was largely lacking, and society was adrift, transfixed by the dilemmas of an aging population and a sense of unease over the economic malaise. In addition, there was a sense that Japan’s place in the world was slipping, especially before the rising economic power of China and, to a lesser extent, South Korea. For a combination of reasons, Koizumi decided to walk through the Devil’s Gate into the unknown.

Since 2001, Koizumi has given the world the image of Godzilla, the famous screen monster, always rising out of the sea and fighting over Japan, usually against bad monsters. In a broad sense, Godzilla represented the Schumpeter-like forces of creative destruction. Although Godzilla often destroyed Tokyo (while fighting the bad monsters), this caused the inhabitants to rebuild their city – at least the city was always brand new in each successive movie. In the same sense, Koizumi projects an image that he too is releasing creative destruction and from the ruins of the old Japanese economy, a new stronger and more modern economy will emerge. Consequently, Koizumi is credited for launching a “revolution” of economic change in Japan. He has made proclamations of his willingness to shake up Japan, uproot the political order and bring the economy back to a period of sustainable economic growth. All of this, of course, will help restore Japan’s role in the world.

There is little question that Koizumi is a breath of fresh air in what had become a stale world of Japanese politics. His proposed reforms to overhaul the state sector (with an eye to reducing wasteful spending), to privatize parts of it (mainly the postal system and highway corporation), to clean up bad bank debt, and reform the taxation, medical care and public pension systems, all promised much to an increasingly cynical and frustrated public. After two years, much of Koizumi’s program remains unfulfilled. The rhetoric of revolution remains in place, but the results seem lacking.

The Koizumi revolution confronts considerable opposition, both within the government and out. Members of Koizumi’s own Liberal Democratic party (LDP) have fought hard against reform as have business leaders from the protected and often inefficient domestic sector – agriculture, retail and construction. Koizumi’s supporters have been under fire for pushing reforms and in some cases there have been sustained efforts to force them to resign.

Additional opposition to the Koizumi reforms comes from the banks, many of which carry bad debts from what have come to be known as the zombie companies. It is no mistake that most of the zombies are in the retail, agriculture and construction sectors. Many of the same companies have long held close political ties to the ruling LDP. LDP members have not been shy about seeking ongoing government and bank forbearance for dead-beat companies. Adding another layer of opposition to reform comes from within the bureaucracy, where certain factions have been ill at ease at the idea of allowing bankrupt companies to actually go bankrupt. This also implies that the banks should stop providing loans and begin calling non-performing loans what they are – lost money.

All of this means that Koizumi coming to power in 2001 faced a Gordian Knot of the Japanese political economy, an intricate system created in the aftermath of the Second World War to help Japan catch up with the West economically. The system placed an emphasis on business, government and the LDP working together to expand and upgrade the country’s industrial infrastructure geared for export markets. In essence, the government guided the nation’s development, channeling credit to key sectors through the financial system.

The high level of success of that development model in the 1950s and 1960s, however, guaranteed that making any substantial changes would be difficult. While the global economy changed and Japan’s major exporting companies adapted, the rest of the development model did not. It was politically easier to tinker around the edges than it was to make a meaningful overhaul. While the 1980s showed a highly dynamic Japanese economy to the world, the structural weaknesses inherent in the system, in particular the stunted role of the banks, the shallow nature of capital markets, and poor corporate governance were all to be revealed in the “lost decade” of the 1990s.

The consensus-driven nature of Japanese society and the factional nature of its politics made the arrival of a strong leader, willing and able to cut the Gordian Knot of the political economy, difficult. Throughout much of the postwar era, Japanese prime ministers have operated with far less power than their Western counterparts, considering that they often had to play to a number of factions within the LDP. Achieving consensus was time-consuming and opaque, allowing considerable latitude to the bureaucracy in how policy should be implemented. It was therefore a surprise in 2001 when Koizumi, one of the country’s more colorful leaders, emerged as the head of the LDP and became prime minister. Regarded as handsome, with wavy hair and slender build, he became well know for being an Elvis fan and for having something lacking in earlier leaders, flamboyance.

The reality of the Koizumi revolution is that is really more of an evolution. For all the marketing of Prime Minister Koizumi as a revolutionary, he is more of a reformer and a master manipulator of the press. Simply stated, Japan under Koizumi since 2001 is seeing an evolution of reform, not a revolution. One of the definitions for revolution is “any complete change of method or conditions”. This implies sweeping changes in how things are done. Japan after two years of Koizumi is not at this stage.

From an Anglo-American standpoint this evokes a sense of disappointment, that Japan is forever condemned to the promise of reform, but a reality of inaction and ultimately economic decline. From the standpoint of many Western analysts, Japan has seen too many failed reformers, heard too many claims that reforms will now work; and observed too many policy dead-ends. Koizumi initially had considerable goodwill, but patience has been eroded as the Prime Minister’s promises have not fully matched expectations. Deflation is still a problem, the banking sector remains wobbly, and the domestic sectors contain many of the same pitfalls that characterized them pre-Koizumi. And, behind all of this is a stark demographic reality – Japan’s population is aging, which will place that much more pressure on the economy. Accordingly, the Nikkei Newspaper recently noted a National Institute of Population and Social Security report that households headed by those aged 65 and older are projected to increase 65 percent from 2000 to 18.43 million in 2025, accounting for nearly 40 percent of the all Japanese households.

From a Japanese standpoint, what Koizumi is pushing is radical – he is calling for and, in a piecemeal fashion, breaking up the old political economy. He has adopted the mantra of “structural reform” or kozo kaikaku to sum up his agenda and to signal his commitment to radical change. For conservative members of the LDP, the many special interest groups in the domestic economy and parts of the bureaucracy, any change is dangerous as it represents a loss of power, the strong potential of more business failures, and an overall loss of control over the economy by the bureaucracy.

Somewhere between the Western and Japanese views sits reality. Japan is making changes and reforms are occurring, but the process is slow, convoluted, and at risk of slippage back to inaction. Because of this, it is difficult to measure the progress that has been made. It is also difficult to gauge the role of Koizumi and what his long-term impact will be on Japan. It is therefore important to underscore that the two issues are entwined – Koizumi’s place in Japanese history will be judged by how much he changes his country. Stated in another fashion, Koizumi will be judged on his ability to halt the decline of Japan.

Although there is frustration about the gradual nature of reform, Koizumi is changing Japan. The domestic sector is being forced to embrace structural adjustments, some companies are being allowed to fail, and others are coming under much greater pressure from their bankers to restructure with a coherent and more transparent plan. There has been some creative chaos as reflected by the high levels of bankruptcies in the 2001-2003 period. The banks have made an effort to reduce bad loans. In two cases (Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank), Japanese banks have been sold to foreigners, and one major bank, Resona, was taken over by the government after it failed to have adequate capital ratios. Legislation has also moved forward pertaining to the privatization/overhaul of the postal system and the highway corporation.

Currently Koizumi appears as a transitory figure. Within the lexicon of historical figures, he sits somewhere between the Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev and the United Kingdom’s Margaret Thatcher. The former understood the need for reform and started the process, but was unable to bring it to a successful conclusion. Once started, reform quickly overcame Gorbachev’s ability to control the process and his base of support – the Communist Party and the state – proved wholly inadequate to accommodate change and ultimately brittle, destined to fragment. In 1992, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and Russia emerged as the major successor state, commencing a long and difficult process of economic reform.

In sharp contrast to Gorbachev, Thatcher was able to advance her revolution, which entailed the radical overhaul of the British economy. Thatcher was abrasive and ruthless in executing her reforms and the opposition was weak and ultimately lacked widespread public support. By the time Thatcher was ousted from power by her own party, she was largely successful in reversing decades of decline and a profound sense of national drift. Today the United Kingdom is one of the world’s healthier economies.

As Koizumi embarks upon his second term in office he must give serious consideration to his place in history. Thus far he has lasted longer in office than many other Japanese prime ministers in recent history. However, lasting in office is not making a revolution. Much has been promised. He now has a popular mandate to make good those promises. In a sense, Koizumi has pulled Japan across the Devil’s Gate threshold, but not moved much beyond. Does he have the strength to take Japan further into the unknown country, where there are tough challenges and very likely considerable rewards? If so, he will be remembered as one of his country’s exceptional leaders. If not, he will be seen a man with vision, but limited by his inability to implement badly needed changes – a transitory figure, waiting for another more capable (or maybe luckier) figure to come along. Only time will tell.


Editor: Dr. Scott B. MacDonald, Sr. Consultant

Deputy Editors: Dr. Jonathan Lemco, Director and Sr. Consultant and Robert Windorf, Senior Consultant

Associate Editor: Darin Feldman

Publisher: Keith W. Rabin, President

Web Design: Michael Feldman, Sr. Consultant

Contributing Writers to this Edition: Scott B. MacDonald, Jane Hughes, Marc Faber, Jonathan Lemco, Russell Smith, Andrew Thorson and Robert Windorf



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