Asia's Quest for a New International Order:
Low-Hanging Fruit in the Clash of Civilizations?

By Scott B. MacDonald

Asia is in the process of fitting into a new and, as-of-yet, not entirely defined international order. What is clear is that while economic concerns remain core to national agendas from Kabul to Seoul, political issues are assuming greater importance. Two major external factors are shaping Asia’s place in the new international system. On one side is the rejection of globalization and a push down the path of ethnic-religious conflict along the lines of Samuel P. Huntington’s "Clash of Civilizations" and reflected by the violence of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. On the other side is the United States, seeking to create a new world order based on the "War on Terrorism" against al-Qaeda and the "Axis of Evil." Asia is caught between these two powerful forces. Complicating matters, the region is drifting between the growing might of China, the gradual awakening of Japan’s new nationalism, and an India seeking to maintain its regional dominance in South Asia, while beset by its own domestic terrorist problems. What once appeared to be a strong momentum toward greater economic unity in Southeast Asia under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has given way to growing mutual mistrust.

The view from Washington is that international terrorist organizations, namely al- Qaeda and its affiliates, represent a clear and present danger to U.S. security, both at home and abroad. The nature of this threat is such that it must be rooted out around the planet and (according to Baroness Margaret Thatcher in an editorial in The New York Times) as if they were Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks in their early revolutionary phase established cells to overthrow or disrupt capitalist governments. They also had an international organization (the Comintern), making use of the Soviet Union as a base. The West fought long and hard to eradicate these cells and in the period following the end of the First World War were largely successful in containing the problem. Along these lines, al-Qaeda must be treated in the same rigorous fashion and be eliminated.

What is being digested in Asia, especially after the successful destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and reemphasized during President Bush’s February 2002 Asian tour, is that the United States has the military power to tackle the al-Qaeda threat and is willing to use it. Washington is even willing to take the struggle against terrorism to the next step — dealing with the "Axis of Evil" countries (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) that, in its view, help provide intelligence and weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In addition, the Bush administration is making it clear that any support for al-Qaeda, even a refusal to supply information and possibly neutrality, could put a country on the new bad guy list. The U.S. is signaling that even without approval of the local government it will intervene to eradicate the al-Qaeda threat. If the local military resists it runs the risk of becoming a target.

For Asian nations already seeking to derive meaning from the U.S. victory in Afghanistan, Washington has outlined two policy tracks from which it will operate. First and foremost, there are the big targets, led front and center by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and followed by Iran and North Korea. Iraq is clearly more of a target, especially considering the odious nature of the regime, existence of a local opposition and the nature of unfinished business from the early 1990s when the Bush senior administration opted not topple the Saddam regime. Going after the big targets is potentially more difficult and, most likely in the cases of Iran and North Korea, would end up with a high body count. Certainly an outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula would lead to considerable damage in South Korea, especially in Seoul, which is close to the border and within reach of heavily massed Northern artillery. A North Korea under severe military stress could also strike out against Japan.

While the big targets carry a plethora of foreign policy issues (such as causing a major row with key U.S. allies in Europe), the second policy track — going after the low-hanging fruit — is the path of least resistance and is already in full swing. The low-hanging fruit are countries where Al-Qaeda or its affiliates are active. This includes Asia as well as Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Europe. European governments already are active in seeking out terrorist networks as made evident by the Italian arrests of four Moroccans allegedly seeking to bomb or gas the U.S. embassy in Rome. Recent intelligence reports indicate that a number of Al-Qaeda operatives got out of Afghanistan before the U.S. and its Northern Alliance allies defeated the Taliban. It is suspected that many went to Pakistan or Iran. It has also been revealed that there could be around 4,000 Al-Qaeda terrorists in Europe (including new recruits), waiting to strike. While the U.S. can count on the support of its European allies, going after Al-Qaeda supporters in Yemen, Somalia and Sudan could be altogether more difficult.

Clearly the low hanging fruit policy has implications for Asia. The U.S. is already providing training and support for the Philippine government in its struggle against the Abu Sayyaf guerrillas and has worked with the governments of Singapore and Malaysia in their investigations of Jemaah Islamiya. It is also watching Indonesia closely, as there has been speculation that local Islamic radicals are linked to al-Qaeda. Intelligence reports noted that Jemaah Islamiya militants from Indonesia were allegedly involved in the plot to plan truck bombings of U.S., U.K., Australian and Israeli embassies in Singapore. Moreover, Jemaah Islamiya leader Ridvan Hambali apparently escaped to Indonesia.

Although most of Asia is not directly involved in al-Qaeda’s jihad against the United States and those Arab governments which it supports, leaders in Japan, Korea, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines are being called upon by the United States to pick a side. That demand is being leveled against longstanding allies as well as rogue states such as North Korea. Washington is aware that the struggle against radical Islamic terrorism is a matter of military strength and determination as well as economic development. However, Washington is clearly spelling out that economic development is a long- term issue; the military threat is here and now. For Asia, the choices on the menu are stark — sign up for the war on terrorism (which is certainly to the advantage of a handful of governments like India and the Philippines with their own terrorist issues) or run the risk of becoming an enemy. While the merits of U.S. policy are questionable to many (including European allies), they reflect a determination to assert what the Bush administration regards as U.S. national interests.

The imposition of a U.S.-dominated foreign policy agenda is not necessarily a key priority for many governments, who wrestle with such issues as stimulating economic growth, corporate sector and banking reform, and poverty reduction. China must contend with its entry into the WTO, Japan with its deeply troubled banking sector, and India with stagnating economic reforms and large fiscal deficits. The game now afoot in Afghanistan is one of nation-building, which means the development of resilient institutions, the promotion of economic development and external support for maintaining law and order. Developing a civic society is a major blow against the forces that destroyed the World Trade Center. Dealing with the economic ills that ail Asian economies is a sound foreign policy objective for much of Asia.

At the same time, becoming part of al-Qaeda’s chessboard by a lack of action is dangerous, especially in countries where political tensions often are close to religious-ethnic explosions. Tensions already run high in a region in which the Indian and Pakistani armies are exchanging fire on an almost daily basis; central authority remains weak in Afghanistan and more heated conflicts lurk just beneath the surface; and dissident groups foment violence in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

What Asian governments need to address is a mixture of strategic concerns that deal with the immediate risks posed by cross-border terrorist organizations, while pushing for a better dialogue within the region on long-term economic development issues. The 2002 Tokyo summit on Afghanistan should not be the exception, but the rule in Asian countries coming together, taking the lead in problems germane to the region, and setting out objectives. None of this is easy, but the alternative is that much of Asia becomes someone else’s low-hanging fruit and not a partner in the creation of a more peaceful international order.