Turkish
Taffy: Update On the Turkish Political Scene
By
Robert Windorf
Over the past few months, the
Turkish political scene, like that famous candy from yesteryear,
has been quite sticky and has given the nation's political
and military leaders and citizens plenty to chew on. Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit's chronic illness, which has left him
increasingly politically ineffective to see through the many
necessary economic and political reform measures under last
year's IMF $16 billion rescue package, led to mass resignations
from his cabinet and defections from the ruling Democratic
Left Party (DSP) this past July. This was not much of a surprise
as many observers had long predicted the eventual collapse
of the ruling three party coalition. Despite numerous pleas
from his original supporters and the opposition parties, Ecevit
originally stubbornly refused to step down or agree to early
parliamentary elections. He feared that early elections would
further jeopardize Turkey's hopes for EU entry and plunge
the economy back into chaos. However, with dwindling options,
especially following the quick formation of new political
parties by his cabinet defectors, he finally agreed to an
election date of November 3rd.
Soon after Ecevit's decision, a few politicians further complicated
matters by challenging that date claiming it would not allow
enough time for the nation to prepare for the elections. In
addition, just last week, an electoral board announced that
the head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Recep
Tayyip Erdogan (the former mayor of Istanbul), would be banned
from running in the election because of his past conviction
for Islamic sedition. Despite the military and urban middle
class' deep suspicions of Erdogan's reported disavowal of
political Islam and adoption of secular principles, he vows
to fight on, as the AKP arguably remains the most popular
political party. Nevertheless, as of this writing, the elections
are still scheduled for November and the volatile campaign
season is in full swing.
No less than 20 political parties will be vying for seats
in the new parliament. The most prominent include the following:
Democratic Left Party (DSP), headed by Ecevit, has suffered
the loss of more than half its deputies since July and, in
turn, fell from second place in the opinion polls to fourth.
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), built on rigid nationalist
policies, including a tough stance against the Kurds and aversions
toward planned reforms to fulfill EU membership, is now the
largest party; yet, current polls suggest it may not meet
the required 10% quota to retain seats in parliament. Motherland
Party (Anap), the junior conservative member of the government
coalition, is badly lagging in the polls. Justice and Development
Party (AKP), formed last year by moderate members of the outlawed
pro-Islamic Virtue Party, at present, stands potentially to
gain the most seats leading to worries for the secular establishment.
New Turkey Party (YTP), formed by defectors from Ecevit's
cabinet, Ismail Cem and Husamettin Ozkan, has become the fifth
largest party and reportedly enjoys the support of former
revered Minister of the Economy, Kemal Dervis. True Path (DYP),
led by former Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, the main conservative
opposition party, holds a powerful nationalist base in rural
Anatolia. Republican People's Party (CHP), the main center-leftist
rival to DSP which could regain seats in light of DSP's desperate
state. Peoples Democracy Party (Hadep), accused by Ecevit
of links to the rebels within the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK), could reach the 10% quota; however, local analysts
doubt if the party would be invited to join the future governing
coalition.
Given the capricious nature of Turkish politics, we believe
it is too soon to predict an election outcome. However, of
more importance is to watch the lame duck coalition's actions
during its last weeks in power following the recently approved
legislation to abolish the death penalty and to establish
language rights for the Kurds, bold moves designed to continue
to support hopes for EU membership. Yet, we believe that interested
observes should keep tabs on developments surrounding Erdogan's
fight for recognition and the New Turkey Party's potential
to gain more votes than expected.
According to latest reports, the economy rebounded from its
recent crisis, as GDP rose by an annual 8.2% during the second
quarter (4.7% for the first 6 months). While such a gain may
be temporary, it is seen as significant given the 7.4% decline
in GDP for all of 2001. However, business and consumer confidence
remain low and with the escalating prospects for the west's
military actions against Iraq, along with the uncertain political
environment, growth may stagnate over the near term. In addition,
two major conditions act as roadblocks for sustainable economic
prospects: the slow pace of necessary banking industry reforms
and insufficient flows of direct foreign investment. While
the scale of such investment will largely hang on the prospects
for a regional military conflict, outside influences should
not delay the continued and overdue redesign of the banking
industry.
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Editor: Dr. Scott B. MacDonald, Sr. Consultant
Deputy Editor: Dr. Jonathan Lemco, Director and Sr. Consultant
Associate Editors: Robert Windorf, Darin Feldman
Publisher: Keith W. Rabin, President
Web Design: Michael Feldman, Sr. Consultant
Contributing Writers to this Edition: Scott B. MacDonald, Keith W. Rabin, Uwe Bott, Jonathan Lemco, Jim Johnson, Andrew Novo, Joe Moroney, Russell Smith, and Jon Hartzell
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